

RESEARCH ARTICLE



The Utilization Contestation of Indonesian Inland Waters (Case: *Lebak Lebung dan Sungai (L3S)* Auction in Ogan Komering Ilir District, South Sumatera)

Fevi Rahma Dwi Putri^a, Arif Satria^a, Rilus A. Kinseng^a, Taryono^b

^aRural Sociology Study Program, Postgraduate School, IPB University, IPB Darmaga Campus, Bogor, 16680, Indonesia

^bDepartment of Aquatic Resources Management, Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Sciences, IPB University, IPB Darmaga Campus, Bogor, 16680, Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Some of the Lebak Lebung and river public water areas in South Sumatra are governed by an auction system that has been carried out for a long time by the local community based on clans, namely "*Lelang Lebak Lebung dan Sungai*" (L3S). After 1982, the authorities implemented an auction system that transferred the implementation of the auction system to the management regime of the district government to apply regional autonomy. This transition provided governance changes, especially for the increasingly complex actors involved and competing in the L3S battle arena. This article aimed to analyze actor battles in the L3S arena by analyzing specifics about the regime transition change before and after the management of L3S applied, the institutionalization of patronage that was formed, and the social conflicts that occurred. This study used a constructivist paradigm and qualitative research methods. We identified 39 informants as research subjects who were chosen deliberately and analyzed the data using three stages: data reduction, presentation, and conclusion. The study results show that changes in L3S management are dominated by changes in rules and authority holders, which encourage access domination by entrepreneurs/non-fishermen. New working relations are formed by placing local fishermen as laborers and new non-fishermen actors as buyers. As a result, conflicts have occurred between actors.

Introduction

Inland waters produce high fishery products besides the sea in Indonesia. The total area of Indonesia's inland waters reaches 13.85 million hectares, of which 2.5 million hectares are in South Sumatra province. This ecosystem is not less diverse than an ocean ecosystem. In total, 4,782 native Indonesian fish species have spread across various water areas. Of these, there are 1,248 freshwater fish species with 130 endemic fish species, 120 introduced species, 150 endangered species, and 13 invasive species [1,2]. In the Province of South Sumatra, the lebak lebung and river public waters (well known as "*Perairan Umum Lebak Lebung dan Sungai*"/PULLS) stretch, namely inland water in the form of rivers and flooded areas in the river floodplain. Public waters tend to be open/free with rules and low maintenance as open access regime [3]. Bromley defines a regime as a type of resource control that is distinguished from those who have the right to own and manage resources. The four types of regimes include state property, private, commons, open access [4]. An open-access regime represents the free use of resources. Anyone, without exception, can access all its resources with low or almost minimum regulation to govern, maintain, and supervise.

Hardin and Ostrom explained that the open-access regime is at risk of causing a tragedy of the commons (damage to the core of the resource) [5,6]. Learning from this experience, Hardin contributed advice on management regimes given to the government (state property) or private property. Both contain a required set of management rules. Ostrom considered Hardin's idea as an extremely "top-down" approach, which affects the impact of the open access regime and only gains benefits to certain parties and, ultimately,

Corresponding Author: Fevi Rahma Dwi Putri  Fevirahmadwip16@gmail.com  Rural Sociology Study Program, Postgraduate School, IPB University, IPB Darmaga Campus, Bogor, Indonesia.

marginalizes small communities [6]. State representation has a conservative and private pragmatic goal, which tends to be exploitative. Ostrom recommends providing natural resource management to communal communities (commons property) with a type of management called community-based management (CBM). According to him, CBM is based on customary community institutions that apply the principle of sustainable use because it emphasizes the availability of resources for future generations.

The issue of this property regime continues to be a matter of debate. Apart from the need to assess the urgency of a resource in depth, it is also influenced by various factors. The Commons property is a regime that is very sensitive to changes due to the low position of society. Common property resources can change their ownership at any time due to the low position of the community and tend not to have formal legality, coupled with old myths containing bad stereotypes related to CBM, such as the local community lacks the skills and causes a resource crunch. Satria and Matsuda's study describes Forsyth's writing regarding the old myths of poor local communities, namely the causes of environmental damage, they don't care about the environment, and they lack the knowledge and resources to manage resources. The reality is on the contrary, that local communities have the power to preserve their sources of livelihood and political interests in the narrative of increasing the country's economic sector are the main cause [7,8]. The framework above describes what happened to PULLS management in South Sumatra.

Some of the fishing business rights in the PULLS, South Sumatera are regulated by an auction system. This system has been carried out for a long time by clan-based communities and constructs what is known as the "*lelang lebak lebung*" (L3) (currently *lelang lebak lebung dan sungai* (L3S). After 1982, the authority to implement the auction system shifted to a regency government through the Decree of the Governor of South Sumatra No.705/KPTS/II/1982 concerning the delegation of authority to carry out the lebak lebung auction to the level II Regional Government. This stipulation manifests the implementation of regional autonomy based on Law number 5 of 1974 concerning the Principles of Regional Government in the Region and the enactment of the alignment of village names throughout Indonesia (Law number 5 of 1979 concerning Village Government), which abolished the clan government. Another narrative of transferring L3S governance from the community involves increasing regional income, management effectiveness, distributive justice, minimizing conflict, and overcoming degradation. Nevertheless, the limited skills and resources of local communities were unable to support regime transitions properly [9].

The auction practice occurred during several South Sumatra regencies, such as Ogan Ilir, Muara Enim, Musi Banyuasin, and Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) Districts. This research focuses on implementing L3S in Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) District, which has implemented this institution for a long time and continues to survive. Nasution and Muslims describe L3S management under local government management as causing marginalization and new work relations, potentially leading to rapid rule changes [10,11]. The impact of changing the core of L3S rules was identified from the stipulation that bidders are limited to clan communities and have become open to anyone entitled as a resident who has proven to be an OKI resident. As a result, many new actors take advantage of and trigger the actor battle arena in the L3S economic arena space. Most bidders or auction winners no longer consist of local fishermen. However, whoever has strong social and economic capital, investors, traders, or large fishermen are likelier to win the auction.

Scott and Bourdieu [12,13] explain that a person accumulating capital power, such as economic and social relationships, has an important position in battle arenas. JPNN News in 2020 reported an open conflict between bidders on the day of the 2020 L3S in the Lempuing Jaya sub-district, which resulted in serious injuries [14]. The existing theory and empirical facts form the basis of the aim of this study, which was to analyze the actor battles in the L3S arena by analyzing specific research objectives that are divided into three sub-objectives: 1) analyzing changes in L3S management from before and after regime switch; 2) analyzing actors in the struggle for important positions of arenas; and 3) analyzing the developing social conflicts.

Methods

Study Area

This research was conducted in Sirah Pulau Padang, Jejawi, Pedamaran sub-district OKI Regency, South Sumatra. The location selection was carried out purposively with the consideration of implementing L3S, a strategic location close to the center of government, including sub-districts with as many as 19 objects in the Sirah Pulau Padang District, 21 objects in Jejawi District, and 24 objects in Pedamaran District in 2020. These three sub-districts have strategic locations close to the government center of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency,

which greatly influences the intensity of contestation at the auction. The figure 1 below is a map of Ogan Komering Ilir Regency with details showing the three research sub-districts.




Figure 1. Map of research location.

Data Collection

This study uses a constructivist paradigm and qualitative research methods [15]. The informants were selected (purposefully selected). Selected informants are individuals/groups who understand and are related to L3S practices, such as OKI district government officials from the Fisheries Service and related agencies, District Government, Village Head Forums, community leaders especially related to clans, supervisory groups, government officials, fisherman workers, and others. The data to be used are primary data and secondary data in the form of an overview of the area, natural resource potential, and data related to L3S practices obtained from written documents at the OKI district government office and related sub-districts, as well as several village offices with auction objects, which is quite a lot.

Data Analysis

Qualitative data were obtained from field notes, documents, pictures, and audiovisual data. The data analysis method used is the qualitative data analysis method, which goes through three activity streams simultaneously, namely reduction, presentation, and drawing conclusions or data verification, according to Miles and Huberman in Idrus [16]. First, the reduction stage classified the data into categories of record groups according to the research objectives. Second, the presentation stage organizes information and data, which are grouped into a series of words, charts, pictures, and tables. The third stage draws conclusions from the results of the data processing and field verification. These three methods are intertwined activities carried out before, during, and after the data collection.

Results and Discussion

Description of Lebak Lebung and River Auction Implementation in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency

The area of Ogan Komering Ilir District reaches 19,023.47 km², and 75% consists of swamps/waters coupled with river flows, making OKI district have great fisheries potential so that the fisheries sector is one of the contributors to Regional Original Income. It is relevant to the economic structure of the people engaged in

the agricultural, forestry, and fisheries sectors, reaching 64.10%. By 11.04%, the construction sector was engaged, followed by the wholesale, retail, and automotive trade sectors by 7.46%, and other sub-sectors by below 5% [17]. Regarding L3S practices, data on captured fisheries households on PULLS reaches 7,061 households [18]. From these data, if added to non-fishing households considering the open auction rule for everyone, the competition for access to >300 auction objects spread across 15 out of the 18 existing sub-districts is very high. These data support the allegations of actors fighting arenas that triggered social conflict.

Technically, the auction system implemented in the L3S practice is to hold an open forum for offering fishing rights to objects designated as L3S objects. The auction winner (hereinafter referred to as the *pengemim*) has the right to manage and use it as a fishing business within one year. Currently, L3S is under the auspices of several regional policies, including Regional Regulation number 18 of 2010 concerning the management of *lebak lebung* and rivers in the OKI District, as well as in more detail regulating the technical implementation and the rights and responsibilities of *pengemim* in Ogan Komering Ilir Regent Regulation number 72 of 2016 concerning technical instructions for L3S implementation.

Structurally, the L3S committee is chaired by the Head of the OKI District Fisheries Service, with the District Head as the director. Several related agencies were involved as a form of collaboration to increase the effectiveness of implementation, including the Community and Village Empowerment Office, the Regional Financial and Asset Management Agency, the sub-district government as the local implementing committee, and the support of local conventional banks. The oversight committee consists of the Regional Secretary, the Civil Service Unit, and the Legal Section of the Regional Secretariat. This coordinated management strategy is a strength for local governments to implement L3S practices that are considered difficult to realize if L3S management is still in the hands of the community. In practice, an in-depth analysis of the impact of this regime change is needed, some of which will be explained in the Results section.

Some of the technical agreements and rules that need to be obeyed by the *pengemim* include: 1) signing a contract agreement; 2) conveying the results of fishing reports (amount, type, and weight); and 3) paying a tax of 5% of the auction price for the cost of restocking fish resources. Furthermore, fishing effort rules have also been described in technical policies. First, the type of fishing gear used is environmentally friendly, such as nets, gill nets, lures, traps, *seruo*, *tajur*, single lines (*pancing tunggal*), and longlines (*pancing rawai*). Some of the prohibited fishing gear includes the use of chemical and biological substances, explosives, electric shocks, and poisons. Second, the fourth part of the OKI district Head Regulation number 17 of 2016 describes the percentage of L3S profit sharing, which is the urgency for the transition to the L3S regime, namely, distribution justice. Its distribution is regulated by division: 2% each for supervisors, district, and sub-district committees; 4% for village head incentives; 10% for event implementation and ongoing monitoring; and 50% for village government (50% village where the object is located, 50% of this figure is divided among all villages in the sub-district). Article 23 regulates the technique of catching fish resource products. Table 1 outlines the potential of fish resources and the rules for their utilization.

Table 1. The potential of fish resources in Ogan Komering Ilir Regency and the rules for its utilization.

No	Fish type	Minimum rule size (cm)
1	Cork (<i>Gabus</i>) or ruan (<i>Channa striatus</i> (Blk))	15
2	Toman (<i>Channa micropeltes</i> (Blk))	20
3	Serandang (<i>Channa pleurophthalmus</i> (Blk))	15
4	Bujuk (<i>Channa maruliodes</i> (Blk))	10
5	Jalai (<i>Channa maruliodes</i> (Blk))	10
6	Serko (<i>Channa bankenensis</i> (Blk))	10
7	Tambakan or Tembakang (<i>Helostoma temmincki</i> (CV))	2.5
8	Sepat siam or sepat laut (<i>Trichogaster pectoralis</i> (Regan))	2.5

Source: Ogan Komering Ilir Regent Regulation Number 72 of 2016 concerning Technical Guidelines for the Implementation of Lebak Lebung and Sungai

The L3S policy for the OKI district should be a good guideline for fishing efforts through L3S. Unfortunately, the reality in the field is that many frauds or violations are difficult for the committee and the government to follow up on. The main factors are the realization of monitoring and the imposition of sanctions that have not been maximized and the complexity of the fishing problems experienced by *pengemim*.

Changes in The Management of L3S Before and After the Regime Transition

Development of L3S Institutions

The L3S auction case in the OKI district has experienced a change in the resource control regime from a community-based management regime (commons property) by the clan government to management by the district government (state property) since 1982 (based on the governor's decree). South Sumatra No.705/KPTS/II/1982). Referring to Ostrom, institutions (in this case, including L3S institutions) experience changes through at least three (3) levels of institutional development, namely the constitutional, collective, and operational levels, which, respectively, represent the level of institutional change from the macro, meso, and micro levels. This institutional development analysis needs to be conducted to support the description of changes in management regulations that have occurred [5]. First, the operational choice level contains operational rules, namely rules that apply to everyday life in the community. This implies that all human actions may or may not follow this rule. The interaction between community members, including the utilization of surrounding natural resources. Second, the collective choice level creates collective rules, namely rules regarding how operational rules are made or changed. The results of the parties' work at this level will influence or determine the operational rules. Third, the constitutional choice level is the highest level that issues constitutional rules or the highest rules that contain rules about who is authorized to work at the collective choice level, along with the appropriate tasks and functions to achieve the expected goals [5].

These sub-chapters describe the development journey of the L3S institution, which is synthesized from secondary data from continuous research and policy results and mixed with the results of primary research. Institutional development is divided into two major parts based on the sovereignty of the government that oversees L3S management: the period of the Sultanate of Palembang and the Dutch East Indies before Indonesia's independence and the period of government of the Republic of Indonesia after independence. The concept of institutional development, which is set as an operational guideline for analysis, is an open analysis in both top-down and bottom-up directions. Institutional development can be achieved through government regulatory instructions that are influenced by the achievement targets of the ruling government or constructed from the community and specific indications of natural resources and related environments. Figure 2 describes the institutional development process, with the main levels having a significant influence.

The history of using flooded swamp public waters, especially what is often called *lebak* and *lebung* along with rivers in OKI District, has been traced from various sources [7,8,19,20]. The initial development of the L3 practice took its point until the Palembang Sultanate was continued by the Dutch East Indies colonial government, which pulled the wheels of government. Control of the waters in the Palembang Darussalam kingdom era was fully given to the Marga government (the smallest government entity) listed in "*Oendang-oendang Simboer Tjahaya*" (OOSTJ) (the oldest law since the XVII century). However, no single article has directly mentioned the auction system. This explains the possibility of L3 practices coming directly from the clan government initiative (bottom-up), which forms institutions based on local wisdom. The auction practice is not a special instruction from the king, but rather the result of granting autonomous sovereignty to the smallest government entity running its government. The practice of auctions by clans continued with the Dutch government's inauguration in the post-independence period of the Republic of Indonesia.

The change in the L3S management regime in 1982 represented the development of an institution from the top (top-down), which broke the management role of the community. The community is only a participant in the auction, is on the ladder of receiving information (in the participation ladder of Arnstein [21], and has no interest in making decisions. However, the protests of the farming community in 2005–2008 encouraged the government to free the auction object and not apply the auction system for two years. Several informants explained that there was a political agenda narrative facing regional elections, mobilizing public voices through land acquisition for the auction object. Until 2010, the L3 policy was reinstated, which stipulated a more complete naming of the L3S through OKI District Regional Regulation number 18 of 2010 concerning the management of L3S.

Currently, the latest discourse states that the national government is working with district governments to strengthen the National Data Bank. However, it is difficult to implement this discourse. To collect production data from investors, they must determine strategic steps, bearing in mind that some buyers are not directly involved in utilization practices because some are not fishermen, and some tend to cover up production data to avoid increasing standard prices the following year by referring to the analysis of institutional development as a whole. After the regime shift, gradual institutional changes tended to be top-down and minimized

community involvement in management practices. This then impacts the arena of actors fighting inequality in work relations and social conflicts, which will be analyzed next. Figure 2 briefly describes the institutional development process.




Figure 2. Development of Lebak Lebung and River Auction Institutions in Ogan Komering Ilir District.

Changes in Management Elements of the L3S

The L3S auction case in OKI district has experienced a change in resource control regime from a community-based management regime (commons property) by the clan government to management by the district government (state property) since 1982 (based on the Governor's Decree South Sumatra No.705/KPTS/II/1982 concerning the delegation of authority to conduct lebak lebung auction to TK II Region in the Province of TK 1 South Sumatera). The analysis of changes in the management of L3S took great momentum before and after the regime shift. Ruddle in Satria explains that in the management of natural resources, there are 6 (six) elements of management, which are the main characteristics, namely territorial boundaries, rights which can refer to a set of status and ownership rights formulated by Ostrom and Schlager [22,23], authority holders, applicable rules, sanctions, monitoring and evaluation of management.

The transfer of power to L3S changed almost all aspects of management described in Table 2. Both the six management elements described by Ruddle [22] and the elaboration of indicators adapted from the field and secondary studies of previous research. Overall, the management changes show the diminishing role of local communities in the management and how gradually the distribution of L3 benefits to large investors is

gradually increasing. This needs to be evaluation material for the government to realize the objectives of the L3S practice, not only to focus on increasing regional income, but also on the welfare of local fishermen.


Table 2. Comparison of management after and before the transition of the L3S regime in the OKI District.

Comparison	Marga reign period (<1982)	Regency government period (>1982)
Borderline	Natural boundaries, few and wide.	Registered in the decree, the number is increasing (dividing one object), adding new objects (opening)
Authority holder	<i>Pasirah</i> in the government of <i>Marga</i>	Local government, assisted by sub-district government
Rights	Exclusion, Proprietor	Manage/claimant (community), exclusion/proprietor (government)
Regulation sanction	Clan social institutions Customary sanctions, social sanctions	Written formal rules, ratified by local regulations Formal sanctions, economic sanctions (fines and compensation), social sanctions
Monitoring and evaluation	Together with community activities, together with deliberations L3	Oversight Community Group, scheduled evaluations are part of L3S activities holistically
Access domination	Implementing village fishermen community	The public is monopolized by investors, traders, and middlemen
Rental system	Affordable, family	High standard price, continuously increasing, formally bound by law (written agreement)
Funds	Clan autonomy fund	PAD, fair distribution (adjustment of executing village)
Economic and environmental impacts	Stable economy (nb: min globalization), sustainability-based customary institutions	Impoverishment of fishermen, exploitative, destructive technology, environmental degradation.

Source: Primary data processed in 2022 and Nasution synthesis [7]

Competition Occupies an Important Position in The Battle Arena: Patronage and Capital Accumulation

Scott defines a patron-client relationship as a reciprocal relationship between two people (with differences in socio-economic status) that is developed specifically and based on mutual benefit but tends to be unequal through a process of giving and receiving [12]. However, they are not aware of inequality because they feel safe [24]. Leaders with higher social status (patrons) provide socioeconomic protection to their subordinates with lower social status (clients), whereas subordinates provide maximum service according to the needs of superiors. Patterns of patronage relations were also found in these practices. Sourced from the stipulation of rules for bidders that apply to the community, the domination of fishermen is no longer fishermen; instead, investors and entrepreneurs dominate the position of patrons. Figure 3 describes the network of relations between actors in the L3S practice found in the primary research.



Notes:

- ↔ Binding relationship (rights/responsibility)
- Non-binding relationship
- ⋯ Not directly related

Figure 3. The network of relations between actors in the L3S, OKI District.

The domination of the *pengemin* (patron) is currently a middleman. *Pengemin* has a strong relationship with the fisherman chief, who is entrusted with managing all fishing practices on the object. The relationship between the administrator and the fisherman leader or *pengemin* is bound by aspects of capital and debt, responsibility for the working family, and the loyalty of fishermen to work for the *pengemin*. This pattern represents Scott's patron-client archetype [12]. However, a peculiarity revealed by this study is that actors can have multiple statuses. The *pengemin* as a patron also at the same time becomes a client because there is a bigger businessman above him as the main financier of all fishing activities carried out. The commitment promised is the accumulated cost given, replaced by the supply of fish from the seller to the entrepreneur.

It was found that a relatively weak or untied patronage relationship was found in this case between the “*bekarang*” fishermen and daily worker fishermen. There are no debt ties or socioeconomic responsibilities between the two groups. Scott explains that the stronger the patron-client relationship, the more difficult it is for the client to overcome his economic limitations [12]. The results of the L3S case study differ from this theory and have become the novelty of this research. A lead fisherman, who is quite attached, can improve his standard of living with the help of his patron. In contrast to daily worker fishermen, who tend to be free to have more than one patron, but with low income. We define this condition as a novelty of research with a theoretical designation, namely, the positive function of patronage. Although this reality accumulates, the bond between the two becomes increasingly difficult to separate.

The new institutionalized relationship structure is the presence of bidders with no background in the fisheries sector. They are present solely for profit, namely respected community leaders and participants who have no intention of bidding but take part in scaring other participants to obtain economic benefits (*pengemin bayangan*). This structure is patterned such that it becomes difficult to overcome.

Bourdieu explains that a person can enter an important position in the battle arena because of his accumulation of capital [13]. This research reveals that the four capitals mentioned by Bourdieu affect one's dominance in winning the L3S arena. In addition to economic, social, cultural, and symbolic, researchers observe the existence of physical [25,26] and motivational capital as a research novelty. This renews previous research showing that there was a change from Weber's rationality from the traditional to the instrumental by Nasution [7]. It turns out that traditional rationality is still quite strong, with a slightly different perspective.




Figure 4. The arena for actors fighting of the L3S in OKI District.

Figure 4 shows that actors can accumulate capital to try to maintain the arena they control and expand to other arenas. The status of *Tuan Lebak* has become a social capital for regional heads and regional legislative representatives. Not only for himself but also to encourage relatives and other people to participate in the battle arena. The political reality during L3S practices has made L3S a means of campaigning to win nominations, such as the OKI district in 2008, stopping bidding rules to advance to the next election. Even the smallest entities, such as the village head of *Pematang Buluran* and Sirah Pulau Padang Sub-district, take an object to give to the village community to get a vote in the next election. Rezeky's research in Tapus Village,

Pampangan District, narrates the voice of the community to get *lebak* management rights exclusively behind the discourse on re-nomination as Village Head [27].

Conflicts between Related Actors of the L3S in OKI District

A conflict is an event of resistance between two or more actors caused by different perceptions and interests of the same thing, thus triggering resistance from small to large (bloodshed) [28,29]. The notion of conflict in the utilization of natural resources is usually associated with unequal distribution of access to resources from various users [30]. Conflict situations were also present in the current practice of the L3S in OKI District. Indications of conflict are inseparable from changes in the L3S rules, which increase competition for objects and perpetuate the domination of strong actors.

Kinseng quotes Charles [29], there are four typologies of conflict based on their scope and aspects. This typology is analyzed in the L3S case to help represent the developing conflict issues, namely, 1) fishery jurisdiction (policy issue), the existence of unclear roles and duties of layers of agencies (such as hatchery cases and 5% tax), and 2) management mechanisms (law enforcement), the problem of fishing gear violations that have not yet found the best solution; 3) internal allocation, conflicts related to significant inequality in the distribution of results and fraud; and 4) external allocation, conflicts between fisheries sector actors, and external actors. There are different interests among flooded swamp rice farmers, companies, and the public. Based on these four issues, the researcher further analyzed the openness of conflict between actors, triggers, and how the conflict was managed.

Martinez in the book Perreault et al. [31] describes the study of conflict within the framework of political ecology which maps various actors and their motives, as well as the objects at stake. Based on these issues, the researcher further analyzed the openness of the conflict between actors in Table 3 with more explanation of the triggers and how the conflict was managed based on Figure 5. Table 3 describes the reality of conflict between actors in the L3S practice. Most involve the *pengemim* as the main actor in L3S. The most frequent conflict is that between managers because L3S is a place for competing resources. This conflict is growing because many new non-fisherman actors are competing in the auction, especially on large objects that have been the source of livelihood for large fishermen and their fishing workers. Conflicts between managers often spill over into intergroup conflicts. If it has entered the stage of open conflict, it will involve the nuances of revenge, threats, and violence. At that time, the state security apparatus had to intervene.

Table 3. Conflicts related to the management of the L3S are seen from the form, triggers and handling of the conflict.

Conflict parties	Forms of conflict	Conflict triggers	Conflict handling
<i>Pengemim</i> and the government/organizing committee	Develop	Rule violation	Negotiation
<i>Pengemim</i> and workers (boss and manager)	Develop	The price/yield mechanism is unfair	Negotiation
<i>Pengemim</i> and farmers	Develop	Differences in interest, the definition is not clear about L3S object	Mediation
<i>Pengemim</i> and corporate	Develop	Differences in perceptions/interests	Mediation
<i>Pengemim</i> and community	Latent	Resource ownership gaps	Negotiation
Each of <i>pengemim</i>	Develop, manifest	resource struggle	Without/with violence
Farmers and governmnet	Develop	The definition is not clear	Arbitration
Between internal/local fishermen	Develop	Seizing the area / location	Mediation

Most conflicts between other actors can be handled properly, but it cannot be denied that many conflicts have started to surface, but have not been resolved properly. The conflict between the *pengemim* and companies (*PT Perkebunan* and *PT Waskita Sriwijaya Tol*), especially those that cause water pollution due to company waste. This conflict must involve the government as a third party mediating between the two. Most problem solving involves giving compensation from the company to the customer to replace the losses that have been experienced. Many feel that the compensation is not worth it. Figure 5 shows the conflict management approach, which provides an additional guideline for conflict analysis. Based on this reference, the researcher tries to create a conflict typology quadrant that groups conflicting parties into four categories, as seen from the level of form and handling.




Figure 5. Continuity of the conflict management approach (Source Moore quoted by Engel and Korf in Kinseng [32]).




Figure 6. The conflict typology quadrant is seen from the level of form and handling.

The quadrant in Figure 6 explains that the conflict between the *pengemin* and external parties, in this case, companies such as oil palm plantation companies, tend not to be revealed in real terms. However, it is still difficult to find the best conflict management, even though the adjudication stage has been carried out. In contrast to the conflicts between each of *pengemin*, which have entered open conflict and include non-violent actions such as threats, to acts of violence such as the use of sharp weapons and causing injuries [14]. This fact explains why competition in the L3S is very high, causing conflicts over natural resources that are difficult to resolve. Again, there is no conflict between small fishermen and the government, meaning that it is not included in the urgency of the quadrant above. This shows that small fishermen are too comfortable with their position as clients/workers without capital, so they do not realize that there is a gap in the opportunity to become the main manager of the L3S, which can raise their standard of living.

Conclusion

Based on the results of this study, it can be concluded that the transition of the L3S regime from a clan government to being managed by the regional government increased the fight between actors in the L3S arena and triggered the marginalization of small fishermen. Specifically, the research results show; 1) changes in the management of L3S are dominated by changes in rules and authority holders that encourage access domination for entrepreneurs/non-fishermen; 2) New working relations are formed by placing local fishermen as laborers, and new non-fishermen actors as important actors. An actor who has dominated the L3S arena is able to bring it into other political, social, and economic arenas after continuously accumulating capital; and 3) conflicts between actors cannot be stopped between the *pengemin*, the government, and external parties.

As a whole, this paper is a novelty related to L3S research, where there has been little research discussing the actors' battle arena, the detailed structure of patronage relations, and social conflicts in L3S. In particular, the authors also refute the theory that has been developing regarding shackled patron-client relationships; on the other hand, strong relationships can also have a positive impact on increasing the client's standard of living. This is the novelty theory namely "the positive function of patronage". However, it pushed him to bond strongly with his clients. The reality of this growing conflict is the result of changes in the L3S policies implemented by the government. We hope that this paper can serve as a reference for the government to review the current L3S policy.

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